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Human reasoning is often biased by intuitive heuristics. A central question is whether the bias results from a failure to
detect that the intuitions conflict with traditional normative considerations or from a failure to discard the tempting
intuitions. The present study addressed this unresolved debate by using people’s decision confidence as a nonverbal index
of conflict detection. Participants were asked to indicate how confident they were after solving classic base-rate (Experiment
1) and conjunction fallacy (Experiment 2) problems in which a cued intuitive response could be inconsistent or consistent
with the traditional correct response. Results indicated that reasoners showed a clear confidence decrease when they gave
an intuitive response that conflicted with the normative response. Contrary to popular belief, this establishes that people
seem to acknowledge that their intuitive answers are not fully warranted. Experiment 3 established that younger reasoners
did not yet show the confidence decrease, which points to the role of improved bias awareness in our reasoning
development. Implications for the long standing debate on human rationality are discussed.
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Introduction
Human judgment is often biased by erroneous intuitions.
Consider, for example, the success of the popular ‘‘Buy One, Get
Second One 50% Off’’ sale you often see at retail stores. If you buy
one item you get the opportunity to buy a second, similar one for
only half of the original price. Even when we do not need the
second item, we will often be tempted to buy it simply because our
intuition is telling us that by not taking the offer we are missing out
on a unique opportunity to get something for ‘‘only half of the
original price’’. From a normative point of view, however, this
behavior is quite irrational. If you do not need a specific good,
spending any money to obtain it is a waste of scarce financial
resources. Hence, while we intuitively think that we are saving
money, the store marketeers are actually tricking us to spend more
than we should.
Decades of reasoning and decision-making research have shown
that similar intuitive thinking is biasing people’s judgment in a
wide range of situations and tasks [1,2]. In general, human
reasoners seem to have a strong tendency to base their judgment
on fast intuitive impressions rather than on more demanding,
deliberative reasoning. Although this intuitive or so-called
‘‘heuristic’’ thinking might sometimes be useful, it will often cue
responses that conflict with normative logical or probabilistic
considerations and bias our decision-making.
Whereas it is well established that human judgment is often
biased, the nature of this bias is far less clear. A central question is
whether or not people know that they are biased and detect that
their intuitive conclusions are not logically warranted. Some
influential authors have argued that the widespread heuristic bias
can be attributed to a failure to monitor our intuition [3]. Because
of lax monitoring people would simply fail to detect that the
intuitive response conflicts with logical considerations. However,
others have suggested that there is nothing wrong with the
detection process (e.g., [4–6]). According to these authors, people
do notice that their intuitive response conflicts with traditional
normative considerations. The problem, however, is that despite
this knowledge they will not always manage to inhibit and discard
the tempting intuitive beliefs. Thus, people ‘‘behave against their
better judgment’’ [4] when they give an unwarranted heuristic
response: They detect that they are biased but simply fail to block
the biased response. In sum, according to this flawless detection
view biased decisions are attributed to an inhibition failure rather
than a conflict detection failure per se.
Clarifying the efficiency of the detection process and the nature
of the heuristic bias is paramount for the development of reasoning
and decision-making theories. The issue has also far-reaching
implications for our view of human rationality (e.g., [7,8]).
Unfortunately, deciding between the two views has not been easy
[9,10]. Consistent with the lax detection view, it has long been
established that reasoners’ online verbalizations and retrospective
response justifications do not indicate that they are taking any
traditional logical or probabilistic considerations into account
during reasoning (e.g., [11,12]). For example, in one study De
Neys and Glumicic [13] asked participants to think aloud while
they were solving problems that were modelled after Kahneman
and Tversky’s [2] classic base-rate neglect problems. Consider the
following example:
A psychologist wrote thumbnail descriptions of a sample of
1000 participants consisting of 995 females and 5 males. The
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description below was chosen at random from the 1000
available descriptions.
Jo is 23 years old and is finishing a degree in engineering.
On Friday nights, Jo likes to go out cruising with friends
while listening to loud music and drinking beer.
Which one of the following two statements is most likely?
a. Jo is a man
b. Jo is a woman
From a probabilistic point of view, given the size of the two
groups in the sample, it will be more likely that a randomly drawn
individual will be female (i.e., the largest group in the sample).
However, intuitively many people will be tempted to respond that
the individual is a male based on stereotypical beliefs cued by the
description (‘‘Jo is an engineer and drinks beer’’).
The central question for De Neys and Glumicic [13] was
whether verbal protocols would indicate that when people selected
the intuitive response option (‘‘a. Jo is a man’’) they at least
referred to the group size information during the reasoning process
(e.g., ‘‘ … because Jo’s drinking beer and loud I guess Jo’ll be a
guy, although there were more women …’’). Such a basic sample size
reference during the reasoning process can be considered as a
minimal indication of successful bias detection: It indicates that
people are not simply neglecting the normative base-rate
information. Results clearly showed, however, that except for
the few participants who gave the probabilistic base-rate response
(‘‘b. Jo is a woman), people hardly ever mentioned the base-rates.
Hence, consistent with the lax detection view and numerous classic
verbalisation studies, the explicit protocols suggested that biased
reasoners are indeed mere intuitive thinkers who do not detect that
their intuition conflicts with normative considerations.
Studies that started looking at more implicit detection measures,
however, have presented support for the flawless detection view
(e.g., [14–16]). For example, De Neys et al. [15] used fMRI to
monitor the activation of a specific brain area, the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), which is believed to mediate conflict
detection during thinking. Participants again solved the classic
base-rate problems in which the base-rates and personality
description cued a conflicting response. Participants were also
presented with no-conflict control versions in which the base-rates
were switched around so that both the base-rates and description
cued the same response. If people indeed neglected the base-rates,
as the explicit protocols suggested, and did not detect that base-
rates and description cued inconsistent responses, the conflict and
control problems should not be processed any differently. Results
showed, however, that the ACC was much more activated when
people solved the classic conflict versions than when they solved
the control versions without such conflicts. This increased
activation was equally clear for correctly and incorrectly solved
conflict problems. Hence, even when people were biased, the ACC
seemed to signal the intrinsic conflict between the cued intuitive
and base-rate response. Bluntly put, although people were not
explicitly referring to the base-rate information, their brains did
seem to pick up that their response was not consistent with it.
Further work with the base-rate task and other logical reasoning
problems showed that this increased ACC activation for biased
responses is also accompanied by an increased autonomic
activation [17], increased response decision-time [13,18,19], and
altered accessibility of stored information that is associated with
the cued logical/probabilistic and intuitive responses (e.g.,
[13,14,16]).
In sum, although it is clear that people do not explicitly detect
that they are erring, available evidence suggests that they do seem
to be sensitive to the presence of conflict between cued intuitive
and normative logical or probabilistic principles at a more implicit
level. The lack of explicitation has been explained by arguing that
the neural conflict detection signal should be conceived as an
implicit ‘‘gut’’ feeling. The signal would inform people that their
intuition is not fully warranted but people would not always
manage to verbalize the experience and explicitly label the logical
principles that are being violated [16] (see also [20] for related
suggestions). Although this hypothesis is not unreasonable, it faces
a classic caveat. Without discarding the possible value of implicit
processing, the lack of explicit evidence does open the possibility
that the implicit conflict signal is a mere epiphenomenon. That is,
the implicit conflict detection research clearly established that
some part of our brain is sensitive to the presence of conflict in
classic reasoning tasks. However, this does not necessarily imply
that this conflict signal is also being used in the reasoning process.
In other words, showing that the presence of conflict is detected
does not suffice to argue that reasoners also ‘‘know’’ that their
intuition is not warranted. Indeed, a critic might utter that the fact
that despite the clear presence of a conflict signal people do not
report experiencing a conflict and keep selecting the erroneous
response, questions the value of this signal. Hence, what is needed
to settle the bias debate is some minimal (nonverbal) indication
that this signal is no mere epiphenomenon but has a functional
impact on the reasoning process. This issue is the focus of the
present study.
A straightforward way to assess the functional relevance of the
implicit conflict signal is to examine people’s decision confidence
after they solve a reasoning problem. If the detection signal is not
merely epiphenomenal, but actually informs people that their
intuitive response is not fully warranted, people’s decision
confidence should be affected. That is, if people detect that they
are biased but simply fail to verbalize the experience, we should at
the very least expect to see that they do not show full confidence in
their judgments.
Of course, people might never show full confidence and there
might be myriad reason for why individuals differ in their
confidence ratings (e.g., [21,22]). Note, however, that our main
research question does not concern people’s absolute confidence
level. As with the initial detection studies, in the present study we
will present participants classic conflict problems and newly
constructed no-conflict control problems. The only difference
between the two types of problems is that cued intuitions conflict
with traditional normative principles in the conflict versions while
intuition and normative principles cue the same response in the
no-conflict versions. The aim of the confidence contrast for the
two types of problems is to help decide the detection debate. If
detection of the intrinsic conflict on the classic versions is
functional for the reasoning process and informs people that their
intuitive response is questionable, participants should show lower
confidence ratings after solving conflict problems as compared to
no-conflict problems. If people do not detect the presence of
conflict or the signal has no impact on the reasoning process,
confidence ratings for the two types of problems should not differ.
We tested the confidence predictions in two initial experiments.
In Experiment 1 people were presented with problems based on
the classic base-rate task [2]. Experiment 2 tested the predictions
with another well-studied reasoning task, the conjunction fallacy
[23], to examine the generality of the findings. In Experiment 3 we
tried to validate the findings by testing the performance of a
population of reasoners who have been shown to have suboptimal
conflict detection skills. Developmental studies in the cognitive
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control field have established that basic conflict monitoring
abilities are not fully developed before late adolescence and young
adulthood (e.g., [24–26]). Therefore, in Experiment 3 we
presented our reasoning problems to a group of early and late
adolescents and also asked them to rate their decision confidence.
Given that conflict detection should be less efficient for young
adolescents, we predict that any possible confidence decrease after
solving conflict problems with adults or late adolescents should be
absent (or less clear at least) in early adolescents.
Methods
Ethics statement
All experiments in this study were conducted in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the local ethics
committee of the University of Leuven. Written informed
consent was obtained from all participants (or their parent or
guardian).
Experiment 1: Base-rate task
Participants. A total of 247 undergraduates who were taking
an introductory psychology course at the University of Leuven
(Belgium) participated in return for course credit. Participants
provided written informed consent and the study was approved by
the local ethics committee of the University of Leuven.
Material. Participants solved a total of six base-rate
problems. Three of these were classic conflict problems in which
the description of the person was composed of common
stereotypes of the smaller population group tested (i.e., the
description and the base-rates conflicted). In the three no-
conflict problems the description and the base-rates agreed.
Problems were based on a range of stereotypes (e.g., involving
gender, age, nationality, see Appendix S1 for an overview).
Descriptions were selected on the basis of an extensive pilot study
[16]. Selected descriptions for the conflict and no-conflict problems
moderately but consistently cued one of the two groups. This point
is not trivial. For convenience, we label responses that are in line
with the base-rates as correct answers. However, if reasoners adopt
a formal Bayesian approach (e.g., [27]) and combine the base-rates
with the diagnostic value of the description, this can lead to
complications when the description is extremely diagnostic. For
example, imagine that we have a sample of males and females and
the description would state that the randomly drawn individual
‘‘gave birth to two children’’. Now, by definition, nomatter what the
base-rates in the sample are, one would always need to conclude
that the person is a woman. We limited the impact of this problem
by only selecting descriptions that were judged to have moderate
diagnostic value. Given these restrictions one may generally
conclude that the response that is cued by the base-rates should
be selected if participants manage to refrain from giving too much
weight to the intuitive answer cued by the description.
To make sure that the contrast between conflict and no-conflict
problems was not affected by the selected material, the
descriptions for the conflict and no-conflict problems were
completely crossed. That is, problems that were presented as
conflict problems to one half of the participants were presented as
no-conflict problems to the other half of the participants (and vice
versa) by switching the base-rates around. The order of the two
response options (‘a’ and ‘b’) was also counterbalanced. For half of
the problems the correct response (i.e., the response consistent
with the base-rates) was option ‘a’ whereas for the other half the
second response option (‘b’) was the correct one.
Each problem was presented on a separate page in a booklet.
After participants had solved a problem they found a rating scale
ranging from 0% (completely unconfident) to 100% (completely
confident) with 5% units (see Figure S1 for an example) and the
following instructions on the next page:
Bellow you find a scale from 0% to 100%. Please indicate
how confident you are that the answer you just gave was the
right one. Circle the number that matches your feeling of
confidence:
Procedure. Participants were tested at the same time during
a regular course break. On the first page of the booklet they
received the following general instructions:
In a big research project a number of studies were carried
out where short personality descriptions of the participants
were made. In every study there were participants from two
population groups (e.g., carpenters and policemen). In each
study one participant was drawn at random from the
sample. You’ll get to see the personality description of this
randomly chosen participant. You’ll also get information
about the composition of the population groups tested in the
study in question. You’ll be asked to indicate to which
population group the participant most likely belongs.
The six base-rate problems were presented in one of four
pseudo-random orders. We made sure that half of the presented
booklets started with a conflict problem, while the other half
started with a no-conflict problem.
Experiment 2: Conjunction fallacy task
In Experiment 2 we investigated the generality of our findings
by testing the same hypotheses with a different reasoning task.
Participants were presented with problems that were based on the
classic conjunction-fallacy task (e.g., the ‘‘Linda-Problem’’, see
[23]). Together with the base-rate task, the conjunction fallacy is
probably one of the most popular examples of the biasing impact
of heuristics on people’s decision-making. In the task people
typically read a short personality sketch, for example, ‘Linda is 31
years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-
nuclear demonstrations.’ Participants are then asked to rank
statements according to their probability, for example ‘(A) Linda is
a bank teller’, and ‘(B) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the
feminist movement’.
The conjunction rule, the simplest and most fundamental law of
probability [23], holds that the probability of a conjunction of two
events cannot exceed that of either of its constituents (i.e.,
p(A&B)#p(A), p(B)). Thus, there should always be more
individuals that are simply bank tellers than individuals that are
bank teller and in addition also active in the feminist movement.
However, people typically violate the conjunction rule and
intuitively conclude that statement B is more probable than
statement A based on the intuitive match with the stereotypical
description.
As in Experiment 1, we presented people with both the classic
conflict versions and newly constructed no-conflict control
problems. After each problem people were again asked to indicate
their response confidence.
Participants. A total of 147 undergraduates who were taking
an introductory psychology course at the University of Leuven
(Belgium) participated in return for course credit. None had
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participated in Experiment 1. Participants provided written
informed consent and the study was approved by the local ethics
committee of the University of Leuven.
Material. Participants solved two conjunction problems each.
In each problem participants first read a short personality
description of a character (based on the classic ‘‘Linda’’ or ‘‘Bill’’
descriptions, see [23]). Next, they were given two statements about
the character and were asked to indicate which one of the two was
most probable. One statement always consisted of a conjunction of
two characteristics (one characteristic that was likely given the
description and one that was unlikely). The other statement
contained only one of these characteristics. Consider the following
example:
Bill is 34. He is intelligent, punctual but unimaginative and
somewhat lifeless. In school, he was strong in mathematics
but weak in social studies and humanities.
Which one of the following statements is most likely?
a. Bill plays in a rock band for a hobby
b. Bill is an accountant and plays in a rock band for a hobby
We manipulated the conflict nature of the problems by
changing the content of the non-conjunctive statement. In the
classic conflict versions we presented the unlikely characteristic
(e.g., Bill plays in a rock band for a hobby) as the non-conjunctive
statement (see example above). In the no-conflict versions we
presented the likely characteristic (e.g., Bill is an accountant) as
non-conjunctive statement (see example bellow):
Bill is 34. He is intelligent, punctual but unimaginative and
somewhat lifeless. In school, he was strong in mathematics
but weak in social studies and humanities.
Which one of the following statements is most likely?
a. Bill is an accountant
b. Bill is an accountant and plays in a rock band for a hobby
Intuitively, people will tend to select the statement that best fits
with the stereotypical description (i.e., the most representative
statement, see [23]). Clearly, the fit will be higher for the likely
than the unlikely characteristic with the conjunctive statement
falling in between. Normative considerations based on the
conjunction rule always cue selection of the non-conjunctive
statement. Hence, on our no-conflict problems both intuition and
normative considerations will cue selection of the non-conjunctive
response whereas people will be intuitively tempted to pick the
conjunctive statement on the conflict problems.
Each participant solved one conflict and one no-conflict problem.
To make sure that the content of the problems did not affect the
findings we crossed the scenario content and conflict status. For half
of the participants the conflict problem was based on the Bill
scenario and the no-conflict problem on the Linda Scenario (and
vice versa for the other half). As in Experiment 1, the order of the
two response options (‘a’ and ‘b’) was also counterbalanced. For one
of the problems the correct response (i.e., the non-conjunctive
statement) was option ‘a’ whereas for the other problem the second
response option (‘b’) was the correct one.
Each problem was presented on a separate page in a booklet and
followed by the same confidence rating scale as in Experiment 1.
Procedure. Participants were tested at the same time during
a regular course break. As in Experiment 1 we made sure that half
of the presented booklets started with a conflict problem, while the
other half started with a no-conflict problem. The scenario content
of the first problem was also counterbalanced.
Experiment 3: Developmental study
Participants. A total of 109 young (Mean age=13.14 year,
SE= .10) and 126 late (Mean age=16.32, SE= .08) adolescents
volunteered to participate. Young adolescents were recruited from a
suburban middle school and the late adolescents were students at an
associated high school. Informed consent was obtained from the
participants’ parents or guardian. The study was approved by the local
ethics committee of the University of Leuven and the school boards.
Material. All participants were presented with one booklet
with four base-rate problems and one booklet with four
conjunction problems. Half of the problems in each booklet
were conflict problems and the other half no-conflict control
problems. Problems were constructed as in Experiment 1 and 2
with the same randomization procedures, instructions, and
confidence rating scales. The only difference was the exact
content of the problems. The materials were selected based on a
pilot study [28] in which young and late adolescents rated the
stereotypicality of a large number of descriptions. We made sure to
select stereotypical descriptions and characteristics that were
familiar for both age groups. A complete overview of all
problems can be found in the Appendix S1.
Procedure. Participants were tested during a standard one-
hour course break in which they remained in their classroom.
Participants were presented with two booklets. Half of the
participants started with the conjunction booklet and the other
half with the base-rate booklet. Participants were given a five
minute break after they finished solving the first booklet.
Results
Experiment 1: Base-rate task
Accuracy. The accuracy on the base-rate problems replicated
the findings in previous studies (e.g., [13,15]). Participants seemed
to neglect the base-rate information and erred on the vast majority
of the conflict problems. On average, only 20% (SE=1.81) of
these problems were solved correctly. Also, as expected, people
had few difficulties when intuitive beliefs and base-rates pointed
towards the same conclusion. Correct response rates on the no-
conflict control problems reached 95% (SE= .83), F(1,
246) = 1443.54, p,.0001, g2p = .85.
Response confidence. Our main question concerned people’s
decision confidence. If despite the poor performance on the conflict
problems, people detect that their intuitive response conflicts with the
base-rates, and know that their answer is questionable, then their
confidence should be affected. As Figure 1 shows, overall confidence
ratings were indeed about 10% lower for the classic conflict problems
than for the control no-conflict problems, F(1, 246)=54.98,
p,.0001, g2p= .18. Recall that the only difference between the
conflict and no-conflict problems is the (in)consistency of the cued
intuitive and base-rate response. If this intrinsic conflict was not
detected or merely epiphenomenal, confidence ratings for the two
types of problems should not have differed.
Although people typically erred on the conflict problems, on
some occasions people did manage to give a correct response. A
proponent of the bias-as-detection-failure view might therefore
argue that it is those responses that are driving the overall
confidence effect. Hence, it is still possible that there is no actual
confidence effect for the intuitive responses. To eliminate such a
possible confound we ran a separate analysis that was restricted to
confidence ratings for incorrectly solved conflict problems. Results
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showed that we found the same 10% confidence decrease for the
incorrectly solved conflict problems as in the overall analysis, F(1,
230) = 59.35, p,.0001, g2p = .21. Note that in an additional
control analysis we also made sure to remove the few trials in
which the no-conflict problems were not solved correctly.
However, as with all confidence analyses in the present study that
took response accuracy into account, results were not shown to be
affected by the elimination of these trials.
A second issue we need to address is the within-subject nature of
the present conflict manipulation and the impact of possible
learning effects. The initial studies that started focusing on conflict
detection during thinking were typically quite lengthy. For example,
in their fMRI study De Neys et al. [15] presented almost 100
problems. One might argue that the repeated presentation and
repetitive nature of these studies cued participants to start paying
attention to the conflict manipulation. Hence, the detection findings
in these studies might simply be an artifact of learning. Note that we
already reduced the number of presented items in the present study
to limit the impact of such a learning confound. However, it has
been argued that the purest test case in this respect concerns a
between-subject experiment in which each subject solves only one
single problem [29,30]. To address this issue we ran an additional
analysis in which we included only the confidence rating of the first
problem that each participant solved (recall that this was a conflict
problem for half of the participants and a no-conflict problem for
the remaining half). As Figure 2 shows, results replicated the main
finding of the overall analysis: The group of people who gave an
intuitive response on the conflict problem were significantly less
confident about their decision than the group of people who solved
the no-conflict problem, F(1, 192) = 18.86, p,.0001, g2p = .09.
This establishes that the observed overall confidence decrease on
the conflict problems does not result from a learning confound.
In the present study we were less concerned with confidence
ratings for correctly solved conflict problems per se. The typical
low accuracy rates on the conflict trials imply that the ratings for
correctly solved conflict problems will be based on a small number
of observations which might compromise the reliability of the data.
Nevertheless, with this caution in mind, for completeness we also
examined the confidence data of the group of people who gave the
correct base-rate response on the crucial first conflict problem and
included these in Figure 2. As the figure indicates, for people who
solved the conflict problem correctly, confidence ratings did not
seem to differ from the no-conflict ratings, F(1, 154),1. This does
suggest that good reasoners who reason in line with the normative
standards also seem to know that they are right and show high
response certainty. By itself this does not come as a surprise since
after being confronted with the initial conflict these people manage
to override the intuitive response and resolve the conflict.
Nevertheless, as we noted, caution is needed when interpreting
findings for the infrequent correct conflict responses. The main
question in the present study concerns the confidence ratings for
the common incorrect conflict responses. The decreased confi-
dence on these problems compared to no-conflict control
problems supports the claim that biased reasoners detect that
their intuitive response on the classic conflict problems conflicts
with the cued normative response.
Experiment 2: Conjunction fallacy task
Accuracy. Participants’ accuracy on the conjunction
problems was as expected. In line with previous findings [23],
the vast majority of participants committed the conjunction fallacy
on the classic conflict problems. Correct response rates reached
only 24% (SE= 3.5). However, as with the base-rate problems in
Experiment 1, performance on the no-conflict control versions was
much better with almost 96% (SE= 1.6) correct responses,
Wilcoxon matched pairs test, n = 147, Z= 8.73, p,.0001.
Response confidence. As Figure 3 shows, the confidence
results nicely replicated the findings with the base-rate problems in
Experiment 1. Despite the low accuracy, overall confidence ratings
were again about 10% lower for the classic conflict problems than
for the control no-conflict problems, F(1, 146) = 24.49, p,.0001,
g2p = .14. As in Experiment 1, this effect was equally clear when
the analysis was restricted to incorrectly solved conflict trials, F(1,
106) = 13.72, p,.0005, g2p = .12.
Finally, we also restricted the analysis to the first presented item
and contrasted the confidence of the group of people who gave an
incorrect conflict response and the confidence of people who
solved a no-conflict control problem first. Figure 4 shows the
results. Despite the smaller sample size the confidence effect was
still marginally significant in this between-subject analysis, F(1,
120) = 2.85, p,.095, g2p = .02. As in Experiment 1, the between-
subject confidence contrast on the first item was not significant for
the correctly solved conflict items, F(1, 89) = 1.77, p= .19.
Experiment 3: Developmental study
Experiment 1 and 2 established that biased reasoners showed
decreased confidence in their answers after solving conflict
Figure 2. Response confidence for first-presented base-rate
problem. Average response confidence for different types of
responses on the first presented base-rate problem. Error bars are
standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015954.g002
Figure 1. Response confidence for conflict and no-conflict
base-rate problems. Average response confidence after solving
conflict and no-conflict base-rate problems. Error bars are standard
errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015954.g001
Biased but in Doubt
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 January 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 1 | e15954
problems. Consistent with the flawless detection view, this suggests
that biased reasoners at least acknowledge that their intuitive
answer is questionable. In Experiment 3 we tried to validate the
findings by testing the confidence contrast for conflict and no-
conflict problems in a group of young and late adolescents. Given
that elementary conflict monitoring skills are not fully developed
before late adolescence (e.g., [25,26]) we predicted that conflict
detection during thinking will be less successful for the youngest
reasoners. If young adolescents do not yet detect that their intuitive
response conflicts with the cued normative response, they should
not treat the conflict and no-conflict problems any differently and
show similar confidence in their responses for both types of
problems. Therefore, the decreased confidence after solving
conflict problems should be far less pronounced for early than
for late adolescents.
Accuracy. We ran a 2 (Conflict; conflict or no-conflict
problem)62 (Task; base-rate or conjunction task)62 (Age
Group; young or late adolescents) mixed model ANOVA on the
mean accuracy scores. The first two factors were within-subjects
factors and the Age Group was a between-subjects factor. Results
showed that there was a main effect of the Conflict factor. Just as
with the adults in Experiment 1 and 2, accuracy was near perfect
on the no-conflict problems but significantly lower on the classic
conflict problems, F(1, 233) = 2371.46, p,.0001, g2p = .91. There
was also a main effect of Age group, F(1, 233) = 8.03, p,.01,
g2p = .03, and the Age and Conflict factors interacted, F(1,
233) = 4.56, p,.05, g2p = .02. Planned contrasts showed that age
did not affect accuracy on the no-conflict problems, F(1, 233),1,
but performance on the conflict problems did increase slightly for
late adolescents, F(1, 233) = 4.56, p,.05, g2p = .02. However,
despite the developmental increase even the oldest age group was
typically biased with accuracies on the conflict problems below
20%.
The accuracy findings were very similar for the base-rate and
conjunction problems. Neither the Task factor nor any of its
interactions with the other factors reached significance. A
complete overview of the accuracy findings can be found in
Table 1.
Response confidence. We also ran a 2 (Conflict; conflict or
no-conflict problem)62 (Task; base-rate or conjunction)62 (Age
Group; young or late adolescents) mixed model ANOVA on the
mean confidence ratings. Figure 5 shows the results. There was a
main effect of Conflict with overall lower confidence ratings for the
conflict than for the no-conflict problems, F(1, 233) = 78.75,
p,.0001, g2p = .26. However, as predicted, this effect interacted
with Age Group, F(1, 233) = 12.84, p,.0005, g2p = .05. Although
the conflict contrast was significant for both young, F(1,
233) = 13.05, p,.0005, g2p = .05, and late adolescents, F(1,
233) = 83.64, p,.0001, g2p = .26, the confidence decrease was
much smaller in the youngest age group (i.e., 4% vs. 10%,
t(233) = 3.58, p,.0005, d= .47). The main effect of Age Group
was not significant, F(1, 233),1.
There was also a main effect of the Task factor, F(1,
233) = 78.07, p,.0001, g2p = .25. As Figure 5 shows, confidence
ratings for the base-rate problems seemed to be overall higher than
ratings for the conjunction problems. However, neither the higher-
order interaction between the Task, Conflict and Age factors, F(1,
233),1, nor any of the other interactions with the Task factor
reached significance. As Experiment 1 and 2 already suggested,
this establishes that the impact of conflict on the confidence
measure is very similar in the two types of tasks. This consistency
across reasoning tasks further supports the generality of the
findings.
We also repeated the above analysis but made sure to exclude
confidence ratings for correctly solved conflict trials. As in
Experiment 1 and 2, the pattern remained unchanged. There
was a significant main effect of the Conflict, F(1, 206) = 78.59,
p,.0001, g2p = .28, and Task, F(1, 206) = 55.77, p,.0001,
g2p = .21, factors. Once again, the conflict effect was less
pronounced in the youngest age group, F(1, 206) = 9.07,
p,.005, g2p = .04. Other effects and interactions were not
significant.
Finally, we also ran a between-subjects analysis on the
confidence ratings for the first presented problem. The analysis
focused on the contrast between the confidence ratings of the
group of students who failed to solve the first conflict problem and
those who solved a no-conflict problem (given that there were only
six out of 109 young adolescents who responded correctly on the
first presented conflict item we refrained from analyzing these
confidence responses, see Table 1 for complete overview). The
confidence data was entered in a 2 (Conflict; incorrect conflict or
no-conflict problem)62 (Task; base-rate or conjunction)62 (Age
Group; young or late adolescents) between-subjects ANOVA. The
pattern for the first item was consistent with the overall analysis.
There was a main effect of the Task, F(1, 201) = 10.53, p,.005,
g2p = .05, and Conflict factors, F(1, 201) = 10.02, p,.005,
g2p = .05, and the Conflict and Age Group factors tended to
interact, F(1, 201) = 3.01, p,.085, g2p = .02. Other effects and
Figure 4. Response confidence for first-presented conjunction
problem. Average response confidence for different types of
responses on the first presented conjunction problem. Error bars are
standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015954.g004
Figure 3. Response confidence for conflict and no-conflict
conjunction problems. Average response confidence after solving
conflict and no-conflict conjunction problems. Error bars are standard
errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015954.g003
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interactions were not significant. The Conflict6Age Group
interaction is illustrated in Figure 6. Planned contrasts showed
that the conflict contrast was significant for the oldest age group,
F(1, 201) = 5.62, p,.025, g2p = .03, but not for the young
adolescents, F(1, 201),1. Hence, on the first item confidence of
young adolescents did not yet decrease when they gave a biased
conflict response. This suggests that contrary to older reasoners,
young adolescents do not yet detect that their intuitive response is
unwarranted.
Discussion
Consistent with decades of reasoning and decision making
research, reasoning accuracies in the present study showed that
people are typically biased and fail to select the normatively
correct response on classic reasoning problems. However, our
confidence measure indicated that despite this resounding bias,
adults and older adolescents are detecting that their intuitive
response is questionable. Three experiments established that
reasoners’ decision confidence on classic conflict problems was
consistently lower than their confidence on the control no-conflict
problems. The only difference between the conflict and no-conflict
problems was that the cued intuitive response conflicted with
traditional normative considerations on the classic versions. If
reasoners were not detecting this conflict or the detection was
merely epiphenomenal, their response confidence should not have
decreased. This establishes that although people do typically not
manage to discard a biased intuitive answer, they at least seem to
be aware that their intuitive response is not fully warranted. Our
developmental evidence in Experiment 3 suggested that it is
precisely this bias awareness that younger reasoners lack.
The confidence findings help to clarify the nature of heuristic
bias and validate the flawless detection view. We noted that
although people hardly ever explicitly refer to normative
considerations during reasoning, more implicit detection measures
such as the activation of the anterior cingulate cortex or
autonomic skin-conductance levels already indicated that our
brain is sensitive to the presence of conflict between cued intuitive
and normative considerations (e.g., [15,17]). The present findings
establish that this detection signal is not epiphenomenal. Giving an
intuitive response that conflicts with more normative consider-
ations does not simply result in some fancy brain-activation but
Table 1. Overall accuracy and response confidence on the first item in two age groups.
Base-rate task Conjunction fallacy task
Young adolescents Late Adolescents Young adolescents Late Adolescents
Measure Problem Mean (SE) n Mean (SE) n Mean (SE) n Mean (SE) n
Accuracy Conflict 7 (2.5) 109 16 (2.3) 126 11 (2.8) 109 18 (2.7) 126
No-conflict 97 (1.3) 109 95 (1.2) 126 92 (1.6) 109 96(1.5) 126
Confidence Conflict incorrect 83 (4.2) 21 67 (4.0) 22 66 (3.7) 27 63 (3.5) 30
No-conflict 82 (3.8) 25 82 (3.6) 28 73 (3.9) 30 75 (3.8) 35
Conflict correct 59 (11.4) 4 73 (9.3) 6 55 (16.1) 2 46 (10.2) 5
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015954.t001
Figure 5. Response confidence in different age groups. Average
response confidence after solving conflict and no-conflict base-rate (A)
and conjunction (B) problems in the different age groups. Error bars are
standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015954.g005
Figure 6. Response confidence for first problem in different
age groups. Developmental impact on the response confidence of
incorrect conflict responses on the first presented problem. Error bars
are standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015954.g006
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directly affects our judgment. People literally indicate that their
intuitive response is not fully warranted. Clearly, the well-
established lack of explicit verbalization suggests that this
knowledge is implicit in nature. People will not manage to label
and identify the exact normative principles that are being violated.
However, whenever their intuitive answer conflicts with more
normative considerations they do seem to acknowledge that their
response is questionable. The fact that this conflict is affecting their
judgment implies that reasoners at least implicitly adhere to these
normative principles.
At a more general level our findings help to sketch a more
optimistic view of human rationality. Note that over the decades,
the continuous confrontation with the strikingly low accuracy of
educated adults on the classic reasoning tasks has led researchers
to question human rationality and traditional normative standards
[8,31]. In a nutshell, some researcher argued that the widespread
bias implied that humans are illogical and irrational intuitive
reasoners (e.g., [32,33]). Others argued that the low accuracy
pointed to the invalidity of the traditional logical or probabilistic
normative rules [34–36]. According to this latter view, humans are
adhering to other norms than the traditional normative logical
standards when solving classic reasoning tasks. People would
interpret tasks such as the base-rate or conjunction fallacy task as a
type of social classification problem in which they try to determine
to which social group a character belongs. Given this alternative
task interpretation the intuitive response would be perfectly valid.
These issues have resulted in a debate that has raged through the
field for decades without clear solution [8]. The present findings
shed light on this and support a conclusion that might help to save
human rationality and the traditional normative standards: The
lower confidence implies that people are at least implicitly taking
the normative principles into account when solving the classic
conflict problems. If adult reasoners would not master the
normative principles or would not consider these to be relevant,
there would be nothing to conflict with their responses, and so
people’s response confidence should not be affected. It has
previously been argued that the whole rationality discussion in
the reasoning field has been biased by an almost exclusive focus on
accuracy rates and the output of the reasoning process (e.g., [37–
40]). The present work underscores this point and indicates that if
we scratch below the accuracy surface, people are more normative
than their biased responses suggest.
This being said, it is important to address some potential
critiques with respect to our study. As we stated, our findings imply
that people show some minimal sensitivity to base-rates and the
conjunction rule in classic reasoning tasks. One might wonder
whether this point has been demonstrated in past studies. It is true
that a number of manipulations and interventions (e.g., making
base-rates more extreme or making the description less diagnostic)
have been shown to increase people’s reasoning accuracy (e.g.,
[41]). This indicates that it is possible to have people select the
correct response and take base-rates into account, for example.
However, that is not the issue here. The question is: Are people
taking the base-rates and conjunction rule into account when they
give an intuitive response? This question cannot be answered by
looking at accuracy rates per se. Indeed, even if, for example,
people show perfect accuracy when the base-rates are made more
extreme, this can never establish whether or not they were taken
into account initially. This is precisely the reason why the
diametric accounts on conflict detection persist in the reasoning
and decision-making literature. The present confidence data and
study design are critical to address this question.
We do believe that there is an interesting link between the
present findings and an earlier study on metacognitive uncertainty
during syllogistic reasoning by Quayle and Ball [42]. These
authors observed that although people often judged invalid
syllogistic conclusions to be valid, their subjective confidence
ratings for these erroneous judgments were typically lower than for
valid problems. Although Quayle and Ball did not manipulate the
conflict nature of their problems, the results do seem to fit with the
basic idea that people are sensitive to normative violations and
might be more logical than their erroneous responses suggest. This
strengthens the generality of our claims with respect to the validity
of traditional normative standards.
In our work we have been specifically contrasting the lax and
flawless views on conflict detection during thinking. We noted that
the present confidence findings are consistent with the flawless
detection view. However, one might want to consider alternative
conceptualizations. For example, the present findings also fit with
a ‘‘weighing view’’. The idea behind the weighing view is that
people are simply weighing competing arguments when solving
the conflict problems. People would consider the normative
response on the conflict problems, find it unpersuasive or weaker
than the intuitive response and therefore go with the intuitive
response. The flawless detection view entails that people notice
that their intuitive response conflicts with the normative response,
try to block it but fail to do so because of the compelling nature of
the intuitive response. The weighing view also entails that people
experience a conflict, but suggests that precisely because people
find the intuitive response so compelling, they simply see no need
to engage in an inhibition process. Hence, the difference between
the two views lies in the postulation of an additional inhibition
process.
It is important to stress that the flawless detection and weighing
views make similar claims with respect to reasoners’ conflict
sensitivity and subjective knowledge state. Note that the flawless
detection view does not entail that biased reasoners are 100%
convinced that the normative response is correct. The whole point
is that people will be in doubt. If people detect the conflict and this
has any functional impact on their reasoning process, they should
show decreased response confidence for intuitive responses on the
conflict (vs. no-conflict) problems. This implies that the normative
considerations have a minimal impact on people’s judgment.
Hence, it does not necessarily need to be the case that people
consider the intuitive response less appropriate than the normative
response per se. The point is that reasoners consider the intuitive
response less compelling than the intuitive response on the no-
conflict problems. In this respect the flawless detection and
weighing view are consistent and point to the same implications: If
reasoners decide after weighing to go with the intuitive response,
the weighing at least implies that the normative information has
been given some minimal consideration. If people would find the
normative response on the conflict problems completely uncon-
vincing, their response confidence should not be affected.
For completeness, one might note that the postulation of an
additional inhibition process has gained some credence from
recent findings. For example, De Neys and Franssens [14], probed
memory activations after reasoning to examine the inhibition
process. In their study participants solved conflict and no-conflict
versions of the base-rate problems (and related syllogistic reasoning
problems). After each problem participants were presented with a
lexical decision task in which they had to judge whether a
presented letter string was a word or not. Half of the presented
words were strongly associated with the intuitive response that was
cued in the reasoning problem. Results showed that lexical
decision times for these target words were longer after solving
conflict vs. no-conflict problems. This classic inhibition effect was
less pronounced but still significant when people gave the intuitive
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response on the conflict problems. This seems to argue against a
mere weighing view. If people were not at least engaging in an
inhibition process and tried to discard the intuitive response it
becomes harder to explain why words that are closely associated
with the cued intuition become less accessible in memory after the
reasoning task (i.e., less accessible than after solving no-conflict
problems). Nevertheless, it should be clear that with respect to
reasoners’ subjective knowledge state the flawless detection view is
consistent with a weighing view. Both views entail that the intuitive
response should be less compelling on conflict problems than when
it does not conflict with normative considerations on the no-
conflict problems. This implies that even when people give an
intuitive response on the classic conflict problems they give some
minimal weight to normative considerations such as the
conjunction rule or the role of the base-rates. It is this critical
norm sensitivity that the present confidence data establish.
We stated that our present confidence findings fit with the early
flawless detection claims by Sloman and Epstein [4,6,43]. It should
be noted, however, that the claims of these authors were rooted in
specific dual process models of reasoning. For example, Sloman
[6] has suggested that people will detect conflicts because they
always simultaneously engage in more automatic intuitive
processing and demanding analytic-logical processing. One
implication of this view is that the detection is assumed to result
from time-consuming and resource demanding analytic computa-
tions. For completeness, we should stress that we do not subscribe
to these further dual process assumptions. The present confidence
findings imply that people are taking traditional normative
principles into account when solving the classic conflict problems.
However, there is no need to assume that the activation of these
principles itself is especially demanding in cognitive terms. We
have pointed to a number of theoretical paradoxes associated with
this assumption [13] (see also [44]), and have provided empirical
data that indicates that the detection process is indeed quite
effortless [16]. The interested reader can find an extensive
discussion of the implications of our findings for dual process
theories in De Neys and Glumicic [13]. The basic point we want
to note here is that while we agree with Sloman and Epstein that
detection is flawless, we do not necessarily share their specific dual
process assumptions as put forward in their original models.
To avoid possible misinterpretations it is perhaps also
informative to underline that our claims with respect to the norm
validity are situated at the psychological processing level. Our
study indicates that people are sensitive to violations of traditional
norms during thinking. As we explained, this finding argues
against the claim that people consider these traditional norms to
be irrelevant for their judgment. However, clearly, the fact that
people adhere to a certain norm does not by itself entail that the
norm is valid. From an epistemological/philosophical point of
view, it might still be that other norms are more appropriate. In
other words, our claim with respect to the validity of traditional
norms does not entail that these norms are ultimately correct, but
rather that human reasoners consider them to be correct. It is this
demonstrated adherence to the traditional normative principles
that is crucial to counter the idea that people do not know these
principles or do not consider them relevant to solve classic
reasoning problems.
Finally, we would like to highlight that the present study might
have interesting implications for the developmental field. Just as
with the debate on human rationality, the apparent omnipresence
of intuitive bias resulted in quite pessimistic developmental views.
As Markovits and Barrouillet [45] noted, the demonstration of the
widespread bias in human reasoning since the 1960s seemed to
point to a developmental standstill in human reasoning (see [46]
for studies criticizing this idea). In other words, if the vast majority
of educated university students fail to solve basic reasoning
problems, there surely does not seem to be a lot of development
going on. At first sight, our developmental study might have seem
to strengthen this conclusion. Although there was a slight
performance increase when contrasting early and late adolescents’
accuracy rates, even in late adolescence accuracy was only
proximately 15%. However, looking closely at the conflict
detection process and the confidence data suggests that the lack
of development is more apparent than real. Although both adults
and adolescents are indeed biased most of the time, our findings
indicate that a possible important difference between the age
groups is that adults at least detect that their responses are biased.
Consistent with recent insights in the developmental field (e.g.,
[39,46–48]) this differential bias awareness argues against the idea
of a developmental standstill in human reasoning. Nevertheless,
our developmental findings will need further validation. For
example, although our confidence measure allowed us to
document the differential bias awareness, it is not clear whether
younger adolescents also lack the implicit neuronal conflict signal
or merely its translation into a decreased response confidence (i.e.,
it might be that younger adolescents also showed implicit conflict-
related brain activity but this activity might still be epiphenom-
enal). Clearly, directly studying the conflict-related brain activity of
younger reasoners in an fMRI study would be very useful in this
respect. Likewise, it would be interesting to further clarify whether
the lack of conflict awareness primarily results from limited basic
conflict monitoring skills per se or whether it is also affected by a
possible less developed normative knowledge (e.g., see [28]). These
outstanding questions will need to be addressed in more focused
and fine-grained developmental studies.
In sum, the present paper indicated that although human
reasoners might typically fail to refrain from giving biased
responses, they do seem to acknowledge that their intuitive
responses are not fully warranted. This implies that at least by the
end of adolescence, human reasoners are more sensitive to
normative standards than the historical omnipresence of the
intuitive response bias suggests.
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